Proposal 4856 · Text / signal

Removal of 0xPhilipp and a controlled transition

Voting nowends 24 Nov 2026

  • A text proposal. Passing it records a position; nothing on chain changes by itself.

The vote so far

From the chain
Below quorum so farIf voting closed now
  • Yes 52.32M
  • No 32.45
  • No with veto 15.44M
  • Abstain 3.89M
Turnout, needs 30%
23.2% · not met
Yes, needs more than 50%
77.2% · met
Veto, must stay at or below 33.4%
21.5% · met
What would change the outcome

237M LUNA of stake has not voted. Quorum needs another 21.08M LUNA.

Now Below quorumThen PassingTurnout 38.5%, yes 64.5%, veto 16.9%

How validators voted

From the chain

19 of 100 active validators voted, with 22.5% of voting power. 64 addresses voted directly.

  • Smart Stake#1 · 6.89% of voting powerNo vote
  • Allnodes#2 · 6.01% of voting powerNo vote
  • KuCoin LUNA Node#3 · 5.98% of voting powerNo vote
  • VegasNode#4 · 4.98% of voting powerNo vote
  • Galactic Punks Validator#5 · 4.89% of voting powerNo with veto
  • polkachu.com#6 · 4.18% of voting powerYes
  • DELIGHT#7 · 3.00% of voting powerNo vote
  • Stakely.io#8 · 2.96% of voting powerNo vote
  • ERIS ⚡️ Delegate for claimdrop#9 · 2.88% of voting powerNo vote
  • cosmosrescue#10 · 2.79% of voting powerNo vote
  • Orbital Command#11 · 2.77% of voting powerNo vote
  • HighStakes.ch | Stake for Airdrop#12 · 2.68% of voting powerNo vote
  • 🦁 The Lion DAO#13 · 2.68% of voting powerNo vote
  • Lavender.Five Nodes 🐝#14 · 2.31% of voting powerYes
  • Terrascope#15 · 2.14% of voting powerNo vote
  • 01node#16 · 2.11% of voting powerNo vote
  • Synergy Nodes#17 · 1.97% of voting powerYes
  • Active Nodes#18 · 1.65% of voting powerNo vote
  • Stakin by The Tie#19 · 1.64% of voting powerYes
  • WildSage 🧙#20 · 1.55% of voting powerYes
  • BackBone Labs | Delegate for $SOUL Claim Drop#21 · 1.53% of voting powerNo vote
  • SOLID#22 · 1.44% of voting powerYes
  • SCV-Security#23 · 1.42% of voting powerNo vote
  • Pro-Nodes75#24 · 1.41% of voting powerNo vote
  • LUNAStaker#25 · 1.28% of voting powerNo vote
  • 0base.vc#26 · 1.24% of voting powerNo vote
  • TdrSys | Auto-Compound#27 · 1.22% of voting powerAbstain
  • Aardvark#28 · 1.08% of voting powerNo vote
  • Centauri Alpha#29 · 0.91% of voting powerNo vote
  • Orion - Auto-Compound#30 · 0.77% of voting powerNo vote
  • Coinage x DAIC#31 · 0.76% of voting powerNo vote
  • ISS#32 · 0.76% of voting powerNo vote
  • Node39.TOP#33 · 0.68% of voting powerYes
  • Ceres Ventures#34 · 0.68% of voting powerYes
  • owlstake#35 · 0.68% of voting powerNo vote
  • Interstellar 🍸#36 · 0.67% of voting powerYes
  • Burrito Node#37 · 0.66% of voting powerNo vote
  • NFTSwitch.xyz | Delegate for $SOUL Claim Drop#38 · 0.62% of voting powerNo vote
  • HEXXAGON#39 · 0.58% of voting powerNo vote
  • Secure Secrets#40 · 0.58% of voting powerNo vote
  • Y#41 · 0.57% of voting powerNo vote
  • TERRA-FIRMA#42 · 0.57% of voting powerNo vote
  • Luna Whale#43 · 0.55% of voting powerNo vote
  • Futura Meridian#44 · 0.53% of voting powerNo vote
  • Free Do#45 · 0.51% of voting powerYes
  • Core Dev (Engineering@Terra)#46 · 0.51% of voting powerNo vote
  • Easy 2 Stake#47 · 0.50% of voting powerNo vote
  • Talis Protocol#48 · 0.50% of voting powerNo vote
  • LUNA REWARDS#49 · 0.49% of voting powerNo vote
  • Autism Staking#50 · 0.48% of voting powerNo vote
  • Mario#51 · 0.47% of voting powerNo vote
  • Solva (CryptoCrew)#52 · 0.47% of voting powerNo vote
  • TCB @THORmaximalist#53 · 0.47% of voting powerNo vote
  • Monster Node#54 · 0.46% of voting powerNo vote
  • AutoStake 🛡️ Slash Protected#55 · 0.42% of voting powerNo vote
  • Nodeplus#56 · 0.41% of voting powerNo vote
  • FreshSTAKING#57 · 0.38% of voting powerNo vote
  • stakingcabin#58 · 0.35% of voting powerNo vote
  • Moon Platoon#59 · 0.34% of voting powerYes
  • moonshot#60 · 0.34% of voting powerNo vote
  • MissionControl#61 · 0.32% of voting powerNo vote
  • 🙏 uGaenn ⛅#62 · 0.30% of voting powerNo vote
  • Interstake One#63 · 0.28% of voting powerNo vote
  • KK Validator#64 · 0.25% of voting powerNo vote
  • AuraStake#65 · 0.22% of voting powerNo vote
  • Wave#66 · 0.22% of voting powerNo vote
  • Stakeflow#67 · 0.22% of voting powerNo vote
  • Staker Space#68 · 0.22% of voting powerNo vote
  • SafePoint#69 · 0.22% of voting powerNo vote
  • StakeSabai#70 · 0.21% of voting powerNo vote
  • Enigma#71 · 0.21% of voting powerNo vote
  • 8moon#72 · 0.21% of voting powerNo vote
  • OneStar#73 · 0.21% of voting powerNo vote
  • Luna Station 88#74 · 0.20% of voting powerNo vote
  • Inotel#75 · 0.20% of voting powerNo vote
  • NITAWA#76 · 0.20% of voting powerNo vote
  • Sapient Nodes#77 · 0.19% of voting powerNo vote
  • BIG Labs#78 · 0.18% of voting powerNo vote
  • RuneTerra#79 · 0.18% of voting powerNo vote
  • Encapsulate#80 · 0.18% of voting powerNo vote
  • The Bear Validator#81 · 0.18% of voting powerYes
  • Defi Suffrage#82 · 0.17% of voting powerNo vote
  • Lunatic Validator#83 · 0.16% of voting powerNo vote
  • Noderunners#84 · 0.16% of voting powerNo vote
  • Long Live Luna#85 · 0.14% of voting powerNo vote
  • Crypto Plant#86 · 0.13% of voting powerNo vote
  • Bit Cat🐱#87 · 0.13% of voting powerYes
  • DEEPSTATE#88 · 0.07% of voting powerNo vote
  • Noddex#89 · 0.06% of voting powerYes
  • 0%(100% cashback)#90 · 0.01% of voting powerNo vote
  • NODESYNC#91 · 0.01% of voting powerYes
  • Basement 🗲 Nodes#92 · 0.01% of voting powerYes
  • NodesHub#93 · 0.01% of voting powerNo vote
  • Cosmos Spaces#94 · 0.00% of voting powerAbstain
  • LuckyStar#95 · 0.00% of voting powerNo vote
  • VALIDATORSG#96 · 0.00% of voting powerNo vote
  • hhhhhhhhhhhhhhh#97 · 0.00% of voting powerNo vote
  • BoyGau#98 · 0.00% of voting powerNo vote
  • Shazoes#99 · 0.00% of voting powerNo vote
  • navs#100 · 0.00% of voting powerNo vote

Today’s active set and voting power. Every validator’s record

Proposal text

Written by the proposer; links are not clickable. What runs is what it does, above.

# Proposal 1 — Removal of 0xPhilipp and a controlled transition In this proposal, **PD** means the Phoenix Foundation and its relevant PD Stewardship officeholders. This proposal is independent of Proposal 2. Passage establishes the community mandate; legal removal and contract changes require their applicable implementation steps. ## Decision requested Withdraw confidence in 0xPhilipp as a Foundation director and direct his removal from that office and the Stewardship Multisig through the applicable lawful procedures. Approve the exact limited transitional amendment in Appendix A and direct PD to carry out the implementation work below. This is a prospective confidence decision, not a finding of fraud, unlawful profit, liability or criminal conduct. It neither exonerates other directors nor determines the outcome of any investigation. The published [bylaws] establish separate corporate and technical steps. This proposal cannot use this amendment or any powers proposed in Proposal 2 to authorize its own adoption, removal or activation. PD must establish and pursue the lawful implementation route after passage. An unresolved legal or technical step must be identified and addressed through the implementation process below. ## 1. Post-vote directions to PD The "Passage Date" is the date this proposal is recorded as finally passed on chain. From that date, PD is directed to start implementation work within its existing lawful authority and publish progress weekly. Within 21 calendar days of passage, publish an implementation dossier covering the records, route, schedules, appointments, funding and completion dates specified in this section and Section 3. The Board is responsible for coordinating the response with the relevant records custodians and publishing the responsible implementers. This community reporting deadline starts at passage and does not wait for bylaw adoption, the appointment of counsel, or a preferred set of records. Where a required item is unavailable, identify its custodian, the request made, the exact gap, next action, responsible person and dated completion plan. Missing material is not deemed supplied. Within seven calendar days of passage, PD must publicly acknowledge the passed decision, name the responsible implementers and confirm that it will comply with the mandate through the applicable lawful procedures and provide the required documents and implementation response within 21 calendar days of passage. The acknowledgement records the community decision; it is not a second approval or an opportunity to reopen its merits. Late or withheld acknowledgement does not postpone or restart the 21-day deadline. A specific legal or technical obstacle must be identified and handled under Section 5, with unaffected work continuing. The dossier must publish the effective Charter and relevant amendments, or an authorized explanation of any publication restriction with the operative provisions made available for independent verification. Identify the exact removal and amendment instruments, applicable thresholds and vetoes, legal-effective-date rules, required notices, authorized signers, and required contract transactions. Seek independent Cayman advice on the interaction of §§2.2.6, 2.4.4.1, 2.4.5, 7.2 and 7.3 and the participation agreements. A routine contract membership transaction and a blockchain software upgrade are different mechanisms; establish which is actually required. No unspecified system upgrade is approved. Identify the person or office with standing to instruct counsel and pursue the applicable notice, arbitration, corporate or court process if signatures are withheld, including a lawful alternate for conflict or refusal. Seek and publish the acceptance, independence disclosures, scope and quotations of technical and conflict/commercial reviewers, counsel and an enforcement coordinator. State records-access arrangements, capped costs, the proposed funding source, existing funding authority and any further approval required. The conflict reviewer's remit includes historical §4.6.2 records, disinterested participation approvals and disputed milestone/commercial evidence, with lawful access and response rights. One qualified provider may cover more than one remit if its competence and independence are established. These appointments do not depend on Proposal 2. A new title or community designation alone supplies neither legal standing nor signing authority. PD may obtain records, request quotations and perform preparatory work within existing authority. A paid engagement may proceed only within a specific existing valid budget and approval route that covers it, with the required disinterested approvals. This proposal appropriates no unspecified amount and authorizes no unfunded commitment. Where further funding or appointment approval is needed, PD must publish the proposed provider, scope, amount or cap, duration, funding source and approval route within the same 21-day period and promptly put the specific request to the competent approver, including Terra Governance where required. Missing funding does not suspend records disclosure, available preparatory work or weekly reporting. Use an existing competent, disinterested authority for independent appointments. If none is available, put the provider and bounded engagement to Terra Governance for express selection and obtain any required legal approvals. Subjects of the review may supply records and request quotations but may not control substantive reviewer selection, findings, publication, dismissal or fee releases. Required formal signatures are distinct from those discretionary decisions. An incomplete appointment or funding process does not postpone an otherwise lawful removal, amendment, election or transfer that can safely proceed without it; identify any genuine dependency on the affected act specifically. The 21-day dossier must also identify the lawful contingency for too few disinterested signers, refusal to execute, or resignations or disqualifications leaving fewer than three directors. State the existing authority, authorized actors and necessary approvals. If no such route is available, disclose the precise missing authority and promptly seek the specific further approval; do not invent a lower quorum or suspend an existing duty to resign. The dossier is an implementation record produced after passage, not an undisclosed document incorporated into this vote. It may specify factual details and conforming execution steps within this mandate; it may not change the removal decision, eligible successor arrangements, powers, thresholds, safeguards, expenditure authority or deadlines. Publish the dated versions and exact instruments before using them. Any material departure or additional authorization requires a fresh express governance decision and applicable legal approvals. If no lawful route is available for an act, publish the specific obstacle and proposed lawful alternative under Section 5; do not substitute a different policy privately. The adopted instruments must expressly give Sections 1–5 and Appendix A their intended legal effect and identify the persons they bind; adoption of the quoted threshold clause alone is insufficient. Until those steps are completed, the post-passage directions are the community's mandate to PD to act through its existing powers. Amendments and contracts take legal effect through their applicable adoption and execution procedures. The "Adoption Date" is the objectively evidenced date on which the last required approval, consent, notice or other condition for those instruments' effectiveness is completed, subject to independent verification and any competent authority's jurisdiction. Publish the event and evidence promptly; delayed publication does not postpone or restart a clock. The broader "Transition Period" runs from that Adoption Date until the authorized removal, scheduled handover and community appointments restoring the five-director target are completed, evidenced separately and independently checked. The new Section 4 transaction controls apply throughout this period, including when four or five directors serve; they then cease unless separately adopted as continuing rules. Existing §4.6.2 and other pre-existing duties remain in force. The 60-day discretionary period may end much earlier; an incomplete handover never extends it. Handover, accrued reporting and enforcement duties survive until discharged or lawfully varied. The Passage Date reporting mandate is not postponed by any of these later events. Publish the case in this proposal and invite 0xPhilipp to respond during discussion and the on-chain voting period. Publish his response or a faithful linked summary alongside the proposal, identify disputed facts and permit factual corrections without silently changing the operative text under vote. Non-response does not establish an allegation. Preserve any notice and response rights required for legal removal, earned contractual rights, accrued rights including any applicable indemnity, and lawful confidentiality. A subsequent independent review must give affected persons at least seven calendar days to respond to proposed adverse findings; it does not presume this confidence vote established wrongdoing. ## 2. Removal, elections and continuity Begin lawful preparatory removal steps promptly after passage. Once the resolution has been validly adopted under the existing instruments, begin any remaining approved removal steps within seven calendar days and complete them without undue delay by the dated implementation timetable published under Section 1. The timetable may allow only the time reasonably necessary for identified legal or technical requirements; it cannot confer a discretionary right to defer removal. Publish the legal effective date, membership-removal transaction, revised Schedule 3 and verification evidence separately. Disclose and remedy any gap between legal removal and technical removal. Do not transfer private keys; replace authority through authorized transactions and secure credential rotation. Preserve proposal [4855]'s election rules, existing nominations, completed stages, eligibility and onboarding requirements, Treasury deposit approvals and refund accounting. Do not restart the fifth-director process. Its specific seven-day appointment timetable after selection and onboarding is unchanged. Within seven calendar days of effective removal, announce the separate replacement-seat timetable. Multiple vacancies are filled by separately identified, sequential elections. Incumbents execute the community-selected eligible candidate's appointment; they do not choose substitutes. If the fifth director joins before removal, removal normally leaves four directors and requires at least three approvals thereafter. If removal leaves three, the ongoing 4855 election supplies the next serving director, and the separate replacement election fills the remaining seat. A delay or dispute in one process does not erase a valid result in the other. Any different composition requires a separately authorized plan. Two-member governance is not authorized. Before removal, verify continuity arrangements for chain/security operations, Treasury access, incident response, records and contract administration. Identify accepted operators, access requirements, funded obligations, backup coverage and transition steps. No outgoing director is compelled by this vote to provide indefinite or unpaid services. Any continuing engagement requires independently approved, bounded terms and the conflict controls below. ## 3. Original handover commitments and completion Preserve the [TLA launch commitment]: contract administration was to transfer to PD Stewardship after one month and contract ownership after three months. The source describes ownership permissions over technical configuration; it does not establish ownership of all software, intellectual property or independent ERIS infrastructure. This resolution neither waives that commitment nor retrospectively approves a departure from it, and preserves any associated rights and obligations without pre-judging their legal enforceability. Any claimed prior amendment must be identified with its approving authority and evidence. Any proposed variation must separately identify the contracts, powers, assets, reasons, original commitment and exact change, and obtain the applicable express governance and legal approvals. Treasury investment alone does not establish protocol ownership. A general label such as "ERIS-owned infrastructure" does not determine whether administrative permissions were promised for transfer. This proposal authorizes no blanket return of administration or new Treasury exposure. Within 21 calendar days of passage, PD must publish a contract-by-contract schedule stating: chain and address; code/version; migration administrator; internal owner; controllers; pending transfers; role-granting and upgrade permissions; current holder and evidence block/time; direct and indirect control paths; intended successor; basis for transfer; required transaction, approvals and acceptance; dependencies; and independent verification tests. Identify uncertain attribution or disputed scope explicitly and provide the Section 1 completion plan for missing entries. The schedule documents the original commitments and this mandate; it cannot create a new entitlement to unrelated assets or waive an existing commitment. Do not label an incomplete or historical schedule as current or verified. Preserve off-chain credential/access dependencies in a secure counterpart with a useful public summary. Verify the relevant entries before executing the corresponding transfer. The same 21-day schedule must explicitly cover TLA global configuration and the Treasury and v3 contracts used by the Foundation, where applicable. Trace who can change owners, administrators, role grants, fee settings, asset destinations or upgrade permissions, including through shared configuration contracts. Identify retained privileged control and its basis; a transfer of one local role is not evidence that upstream control has also transferred. Inventorying a contract does not establish a right to take ownership of it. For each in-scope deployment, record the matching source repository and commit, deployed code identifier and checksum, build instructions and toolchain, licence, operating documentation and maintenance dependencies. Identify whether the Foundation and an independent replacement operator have the access and rights needed to inspect, reproduce, maintain and, where authorized, upgrade it without continuing dependence on the outgoing provider. Publish materials where rights permit; explain restrictions and provide lawful independent verification of protected material. A missing public repository alone does not establish what rights or access exist. Distinguish existing delivery obligations from any new licence or service that would require negotiation and separate approval. Before reporting software handover or independent operating readiness complete, publish the independent verifier's build and operational checks and any unresolved dependency. This is a separate milestone from director removal and permission-transfer transactions. Within the same 21-day period, publish a costed contingency plan for unavailable cooperation, code, permissions or operating support. Compare feasible continued operation, replacement operators, migration and orderly withdrawal options; identify Treasury and user-fund exposure, dependencies, costs, funding, timescales, approvals and service risks. If an option is not yet costable, identify the missing evidence and a dated plan to obtain it. Explain whether any option would require reconsidering the Alliance or its incentives. Put any proposed material change to Treasury exposure, custody, protocol arrangements or Alliance incentives to Terra Governance with its exact scope and required lawful approvals. This planning direction authorizes no automatic withdrawal, shutdown, incentive change, new commitment or waiver of an existing handover claim. Continue unaffected implementation and weekly reporting; the plan does not postpone removal or extend temporary authority. Complete scheduled transfers within 30 calendar days of valid adoption, subject to identified lawful prerequisites and the enforcement process below. Publish each transaction and a fresh independent check that the predecessor retains no direct or indirect privileged route to restore or override the transferred authority without fresh authorization. Trace upstream administrators, role-granting contracts, successor multisig control and pending ownership claims. Preserve evidence of completed transfers and exceptions. This is a bounded verification of the specified control paths, not a guarantee against every vulnerability or unknown key compromise. Removal from office, removal from the multisig and completion of the wider handover are separate milestones. Do not delay reporting a valid removal merely because a separate handover remains disputed; do not report the overall handover complete while scheduled authority remains outstanding. Publish unresolved acts, responsible parties, the specific obstacle, remedy and completion date, and pursue the approved enforcement route. A report alone does not satisfy the transfer duty. ## 4. Conflicts and spending during the transition Within seven calendar days of valid adoption, every director exercising transition authority must publish a declaration of ongoing material financial conflicts, the dated disclosures previously made to both Board and community, the majority-of-disinterested-directors approval for continued participation under §4.6.2, and its conditions. The register covers project ownership, paid roles, validator operations, commissions, protocol fees and other material economic relationships relevant to Foundation decisions. State when a required record cannot be located; a new disclosure does not prove earlier compliance, and visible transfers alone do not establish adequate disclosure. Protected material goes to an authorized independent reviewer, with a useful public summary. Apply the existing §4.6.2 according to its terms, including awareness of an ongoing material conflict and its resignation requirement unless the disclosure and continued-participation conditions are met. Give an affected director an opportunity to supply the records and respond. Distinguish absence of evidence from an established failure. A notice under this proposal does not itself remove a key, adjudicate past liability, or erase a past failure through later approval. If the applicable rule requires action, publish that action and its lawful implementation route. Proposal 2 is not a prerequisite to existing duties. From valid adoption, a beneficiary may not approve their own project budget, milestone acceptance or payment release. Any new discretionary grant, increased fee, Treasury allocation or payment amendment benefiting a director or a business they own, control or materially benefit from requires public conflict disclosure, stated commercial justification and the applicable disinterested approvals. Affiliation alone is not proof that all transactions are improper. Approval to remain a director is distinct from approval of a transaction; neither supplies the other's threshold. During the three-director interim configuration, new related-party funding, increased director compensation and new long-term commitments are prohibited. Existing enforceable obligations and minimum essential continuity arrangements require documented necessity, bounded duration/cost and independent approval; they may not be used to relabel a new grant, increase or extension. If a genuinely necessary new arrangement falls within a prohibition, obtain a sep
Details
Submitted
17 Nov 2026
Voting
17 Nov 2026 to 24 Nov 2026
Messages
0
Tallied by
the gov module, at the end of voting
Individual votes
available
Voting power now
309M LUNA